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NOTES
DES: JUDICIAL INTEREST BALANCING AND INNOVATION
In a typical products liability action, the plaintiff must identify the defend-
ant as the manufacturer or seller of the defective product that caused him
harm.' Failure to establish that it is more likely than not that the defendant
made or sold the product complained of is generally fatal to a products liability
claim. 2 Although the necessity of such an identification has not often been
litigated, an emerging group of cases has cast doubt upon the wisdom and
fairness of universal application of the identification requirement.' Principally,
these cases have involved suits brought by women against pharmaceutical com-
panies in which the plaintiffs have alleged that in utero exposure to the syn-
thetic estrogen diethylstilbestrol (DES),' once commonly prescribed to prevent
' See, e.g., Neubauer v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 18, 23, 238 N.E.2d
437, 439 (1968); Rockett v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 460 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
Sec generally 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1:41 (2d ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as HURSH].
See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978); C.T.
Kinsey v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 137 Ga. App. 681, 682, 225 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1976); Shanks v.
Oneita Knitting Mills, 58 A.D.2d 741, 395 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1977). Sec also HURSH, supra note 1, at
§ 1:41.
See generally Kroll, Infra-Industry Joint Liability: The Era of Absolute Products Liability, INS.
L. J. 185 (April 1980); Comment, DES and a Proposed Than)) of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
Rev. 963 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FORDHAM COMMENT]; Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13
SUFFOLK U. L. RENi. 980 (1979).
DES is a synthetic female hormone, one of the class known as estrogens. It was
originally synthesized in 1938, and it has been widely used in medicine and in animal husbandry
because it was the first available inexpensive estrogenic compound that remained active after oral
administration. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975) (statement of
Dr. Alexander Schmidt, Commissioner of the United States Food and Drug Administration). In
1947, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of DES, on an
experimental basis, as a treatment to prevent miscarriage. Additional Brief for Appellant at 2,
11, Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sindell, Plaintiff's California Supreme Court Brief].
As early as 1953, there was evidence that DES was ineffective in preventing miscarriages.
Dieckman, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During
Pregnancy have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OHSTET. & GYNEC. 1062 (1953). In 1971, a possible
link between in utero exposure to DES and clear cell adenocarcinoma was reported in the
medical literature. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. ENC. J.
MED. 878 (1971). In November of 1971, the FDA required that DES be contraindicated for use
by pregnant women. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,538 (1971).
DES was and is produced from a single chemical formula. See, e.g., UNITED STATES
PHARMACOPOEIA 234-35 (20th rev. 1980). Indeed, federal law imposes criminal penalties on any
manufacturer labelling its product as DES if that product deviates from the officially recognized
formula for DES contained in the UNITED STATES PHARMACOPOEIA. See 21 U.S.C. §$ 331, 333,
351(b) (1976).
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miscarriage, has caused them to develop genital tract disorders such as
adenosis5 and clear cell adenocarcinoma. 6
Plaintiffs in the DES cases generally have argued that application of the
identification requirement to them is unfair. They claim that they often face
many serious obstacles in attempting to identify the source of the specific units
of DES to which they were exposed while in their mother's womb.' There are
indeed three major impediments to identification.
First, at one time or another, between 100 and 300 firms produced DES in
bulk and pill form for various purposes. 8 Thus, the possible sources of the DES
to which a given plaintiff was exposed can be extraordinarily numerous,
making the need for detailed prescription or other purchase or sales records
critical if the plaintiff is to identify the source of the DES to which she was ex-
posed. Yet, with the passage of time, such records, whether those of the plain-
tiff's mother, the mother's doctor, or the mother's pharmacy, tend to disap-
pear. 9
• Adenosis is the presence of glandular tissue in the vagina. It may or may not be a
precancerous lesion. As of 1977, no case had been reported to Doctors David Poskanzer or Ar-
thur Herbst (specialists and scholars in the field of DES-related disorders) in which adenosis had
progressed to cancer under direct observation. In one study of 110 young women exposed in
utero to DES, vaginal adenosis was detected in 35 percent of the women. Poskanzer & Herbst,
Epidemiology of Vaginal Adenosis and Adenocarcinoma Associated with Exposure to Stilbestrol in (hero, 39
CANCER 1892, 1893-95 (1977).
6
 Adenocarcinoma of the vagina in young women had been recorded rarely before the
appearance of several such cases at the Vincent Memorial Hospital (Gynecological Service of the
Massachusetts General Hospital) between 1966 and 1969. Doctors Arthur Herbst, Howard
Ulfelder and David Poskanzer, intrigued by this sudden outbreak of an extremely rare vaginal
cancer, proceeded to study the cases of eight women, born between 1946 and 1951, who were suf-
fering from clear cell adenocarcinoma. It was found that the mothers of seven of the eight women
had been treated with diethylstilbestrol during pregnancy. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer,
Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971). The incidence of this cancer in
females exposed in utero to DES appears to be quite low, less than 1 in 1,000. Ulfelder, Stilbestrol,
Adenosii and Adenocarcinoma, 117 Am. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 794, 795 (1973). But of 68 women
(most of whom were over 60 years of age when treated) who contracted this cancer and were
treated during the period from 1927 to 1963, less than 50 percent survived for five years following
radical surgery therapy. Herbst, Green, Jr. & Ulfelder, Primary Carcinoma of the Vagina, 106 AM.
J. OBSTET, & GYNEC. 210, 216 (1970). The authors of the preceding article expressed the hope,
however, that earlier detection and treatment would allow young women now suffering from
adenocarcinoma to enjoy higher survival rates. Id. at 217.
See, e.g., Sindell, Plaintiff's California Supreme Court Brief, supra note 4, at 11-31.
• No one actually knows how many manufacturers of DES there were. For differing
estimates of the number of such producers, see, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338
(S.D. Tex. 1978) (at least 100); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 602, 607 P.2d 924, 931,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980) (approximately 200); McCreery
v. Eli Lilly and Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 81, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 733 (1978) (over 142 DES
manufacturers in 1953); FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 964 n.3 (the number of firms
which manufactured DES for use in pregnancy is between 94 and 300). It can be said with cer-
tainty, however, that at least 110 firms advertised DES in trade publications in 1953. Sec, e.g.,
AMERICAN DRUGGIST BLUE BOOK 198-201 (1953).
• For an example of how the passage of time can fatally impair the plaintiff's ability to
marshal the information necessary to identify the manufacturer of the DES to which she was ex-
posed, see Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See also Abel v. Eli Lil-
ly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 79, 289 N.W.2d 20, 28 (1979) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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The passage of time, insofar as it contributes to a loss of records or
testimony needed by the plaintiff in order to satisfy the identification require-
ment, is itself a second factor contributing to DES plaintiffs' identification
problems. The genital tract cancer associated" with in utero exposure to DES
has a latency period of ten to twenty years." The passage of such a long period
of time following the ingestion of DES by the plaintiff's mother often results in
the loss or destruction of important records and the loss of crucial testimony
needed by the plaintiff to identify the source of the DES to which she was
deleteriously exposed."
A third factor inhibiting identification of the manufacturer of the DES to
which a given plaintiff was exposed is the once common practice of pharmacists
to fill prescriptions for a designated brand of DES with whatever brand they
happened to have on hand." The decision of some pharmacists to disregard the
brand of DES specified in the prescriptions they filled renders suspect the
evidentiary value of any given prescription's designation of a particular brand
of DES, for there is reason to doubt that the plaintiff's mother actually received
the brand of DES called for by her prescription.
The specific identification difficulties confronting many if not most DES
plaintiffs are extraordinary and particularly vexing as they arise from a situa-
tion involving an allegedly defective fungible product manufactured by many
firms, which causes harm that manifests itself only a decade or two after use,
and then in a person other than the user of the product." For the foregoing
reasons DES plaintiffs have maintained that they should not be required to
satisfy the identification requirement in order to recover for their harm from
DES.
The courts have responded to DES plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the iden-
tification requirement in essentially three ways. One response has been to hold
that the plaintiff's failure to identify the source of the DES to which she was ex-
posed is fatal to her claim." Other courts have allowed DES plaintiffs to avoid
the usually fatal legal consequences of failure to satisfy the identification re-
quirement by employing 'the theories of concerted action or alternative
liability.' 6 A third response has been to require the plaintiff to join as defend-
" A correlation between in utero exposure to DES and clear cell adenocarcinoma exists
in that of 350 studied cases of this cancer, over two-thirds have documented in utero exposure to
DES or some other nonsteroidal estrogen. Anderson, Watring, Edinger, Jr., Small & Safaii,
Development of DES-Associated Carcinoma: The Importance of Regular Screening, 53 OB-
STETRICS-GYNECOLOGY 293 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]. See also AMA DRUG
EVALUATIONS 424 (2d ed. 1973); and MODERN DRUG ENCYCLOPEDIA AND THERAPEUTIC IN-
DEX 300 (A. Lewis ed. 1975).
" Anderson, supra note 10, at 297.
12 See text and note at note 9 supra.
" Sindell, Plaintiff's California Supreme Court Brief, supra note 4, at 37.
" See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 41, cal. 4. Interview with noted drug liability
lawyer Paul Rheingold.
" Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
16 Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 72-77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25-27 (1979);
Accord, Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 	 420 A.2d 1305, 1312-16 (1980)
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ants manufacturers that together were responsible for a substantial portion of
the DES that her mother might have taken. The court then shifts the burden of
proof on the question of which firm actually produced the DES complained of
from the plaintiff to the defendants." Among those defendants unable to prove
that they could not have made the DES in question," liability is apportioned
between them according to each's share of the pertinent DES market. 19
The purpose of this note is to examine selected cases that together repre-
sent the range of current judicial responses to the inability of most DES plain-
tiffs to identify the source of the specific units of the drug which harmed them.
The note will first consider the decision that the plaintiff must, in order to avoid
dismissal or summary judgment, identify the source of the particular DES to
which she was exposed while in her mother's womb. It will be argued that such
a rule of law takes insufficient cognizance of the identification problems con-
fronting the typical DES plaintiff and, therefore, that it is in most cases in-
equitably harsh. Next, a case holding that DES plaintiffs may skirt the iden-
tification requirement by relying on the theories of concerted action or alter-
native liability will be considered. It will be contended that neither theory
represents an appropriate approach to the DES identification problem. The
concerted action theory will be found inappropriate for use in most DES cases
(plaintiffs could utilize the alternative liability, but not the concerted action, theory in their DES
suit against twenty-two drug company defendants); Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., N.Y. Times,
March 1, 1981, at 34, col. 4 (New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld a jury's
award of $500,000 against defendant Lilly, even though the plaintiff did not know which firm
produced the DES to which she was exposed. Lilly was liable because it had engaged in " 'con-
certed action' " with other drug companies to win government approval of the drug and to
market it without proper testing).
Briefly stated, the concerted action theory provides that all who render substantial
assistance or encouragement to another in the latter's tortious conduct, are jointly and severally
liable for the resulting tort. For a fuller development and analyis of this theory, and for a discus-
sion of the theory's proper role in helping DES plaintiffs overcome their identification problems,
see text and notes at notes 49-50, 53-77, and 93-106 infra.
The alternative liability theory, by contrast, provides generally that where the plaintiff
has been harmed by one or more members of a group of tortfeasors, but cannot — through no
fault of his own — identify the tortfeasor who in fact caused the harm, the burden of proof on the
question who caused him harm shifts to each of the defendants. All those defendants unable to
prove that they did not cause the harm are . jointly and severally liable for it. See text and notes at
notes 108-14 infra for an actual example of the application of this theory. For a discussion of the
theory's applicability to DES litigation generally, see text and notes at notes 160-72 infra.
" Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
" It has been suggested that a defendant DES manufacturer can prove that it could not
have made the dosage complained of by showing that: (1) it did not make DES at the time that
the plaintiff's mother obtained her dosage; (2) it did not sell DES in the state where the dosage
was purchased; (3) it did not sell DES to the pharmacy from which the drug was purchased; (4) it
did not manufacture dosages the size, shape, or color of those ingested by the plaintiff's mother.
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Certiorari, at 7 n.13, Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Sindell, Plaintiff's United States Supreme Court Brief].
19
 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 .Cal. Rptr. 132,
145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
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because it was not developed as a device to allow plaintiffs to avoid the iden-
tification requirement and because the theory presupposes a degree of col-
laboration among the defendant drug companies that DES plaintiffs may not
be able to prove. The alternative liability theory, while developed precisely to
address a situation in which the plaintiff is faultlessly unable to identify which
member of a group of tortfeasors caused him harm, is apparently available only
where every party that might have caused the plaintiff's injury has been joined
as a defendant. Since, as will be explained,. most DES plaintiffs will not be able
to achieve such a comprehensive joinder of defendants, the theory of alter-
native liability will likely prove to be of little general utility in DES litigation. It
will therefore be proposed that, of the three approaches to the DES identifica-
tion problem outlined above and scrutinized below, the third, or "market
share,"" approach is preferable because, by forthright judicial interest bal-
ancine and innovation, it avoids the unfair and inappropriate aspects of the
two other approaches. Finally, questions concerning the market share theory
will be explored and changes that can improve the theory will be suggested.
I. APPLICATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENT TO DES CASES:
THE GRA Y APPROACH
This section considers a DES case that is quite unusual because it presents
an instance where the plaintiff, without knowledge as to the source of the DES
to which she was exposed, sued only one DES manufacturer." The court found
the plaintiff's inability to prove that the defendant had actually made the DES
at issue fatal to her claim." It will be argued that the plaintiff's decision to ar-
bitrarily sue only one DES producer justified the court in subjecting her to the
rigors of the identification requirement. It will also be contended, however,
that the holding of the case, applying the identification requirement to a DES
plaintiff, should be strictly limited to those cases in which the plaintiff's joinder
of defendant manufacturers is clearly arbitrary. It will therefore be proposed
that the identification requirement should not be applied to plaintiffs in most
multiple-defendant DES cases.
In Gray u. United States, 24 the plaintiff sued for harm allegedly caused by in
'"	 at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The
dissent uses this term rather derisively_ This note's use of the term implies no such ridicule.
Rather, the term "market share theory" is intended to serve as a descriptive reference to the
theory propounded in Sindell.
21 Sec Sindell, Plaintiffs United States Supreme Court Brief, supra note 18, at 13; see
also text and notes at notes 211-24 infra.
22 In most DES cases, by contrast, the plaintiffs have joined ten or more DES manufac-
turers. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal, 3d 588, 593, 607 P.2d 924, 925, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 133, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980) (eleven named drug companies and one hundred
John Does joined as defendants); Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 64-65, 289
N.W.2d 20, 21-22 (1979) (sixteen drug company defendants); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175
N.J. Super, 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1980) (twenty-two drug company defendants).
23 Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
24 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
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utero exposure to DES. 25 The plaintiff, unaware of the identity of the maker of
the DES which her mother ingested, sued only one drug manufacturer, Eli Lil-
ly and Company (Lilly), and alleged that it had produced the DES of which she
was complaining. 26 Lilly moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
plaintiff's failure to adduce any affidavits or other evidence indicating that Lilly
had in fact made the particular DES in question demonstrated that she could
not satisfy the identification requirement. 27 The court, persuaded that the
plaintiff indeed was unable to identify Lilly as the actual manufacturer of the
DES taken by her mother, ruled that the plaintiff had failed in an essential ele-
ment of her cause of action. 26
 Lilly's summary judgment motion was therefore
granted. 29
In support of its decision to require the plaintiff to satisfy the identification
requirement, the Gray court referred to Wetzel v. Eaton Corporation." In Wetzel,
the plaintiff sued a tractor manufacturer, Eaton, and two of its component parts
suppliers for injuries sustained when the tractor on which he was riding over-
turned. 3 ' The plaintiff claimed that the accident was caused by a malfunction
in the tractor's power steering mechanism that was attributable to a faulty drag
link adapter. 32 The drag link adapter had been manufactured and sold to
Eaton by one of the two component parts suppliers joined in the suit. 33 Neither
the plaintiff nor Eaton, however, could identify which component parts sup-
plier had in fact provided Eaton with the defective adapter. 34
Arguing that there was no evidence linking it to the specific drag link
adapter in question, one of the component parts suppliers, FWG Corporation,
moved for summary judgment." The Eaton Corporation opposed the
23 Id. at 338.
26 Id. The plaintiff also sued the United States, claiming that the FDA's approval of the
sale of DES, without requiring warnings as to the drug's deleterious side effects, was negligent.
Id. The Gray court ruled that the actions of the FDA, in approving the shipment and sale of DES,
were discretionary within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 5 2680(a). Id. at 341-42. 28 U. S.0 , 2680(a)
provides that the federal government is not liable in tort for a federal employee's negligent acts or
omissions if those acts or omissions occur in the discharge of a discretionary function. 28 U.S.C.
S 2680(a) (1976). Accord, Gelley v. Astra Phar. Prod., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 182 (D. Minn.) (alter-
native holding), aff'd 610 F,2d 558 (8th Cir. 1979), wherein it was held that the FDA's original
approval of, and subsequent failure to withdraw approval of, the anesthetic xylocaine were the
result of "clearly the type of policy judgment contemplated by 28 U.S.C. S 2680(a)." Id. at 186.
27 Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
20 Id.
29 M
30 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn. 1973).
" Id. at 24.
32 Id
" Id. at 24-25.
34 Id. Actually, the Eaton Corporation did not make the tractor in question. Rather the
tractor was built by Char-Lynn Company, which was subsequently acquired by Eaton. Id. at 24
n. 1. Since Eaton's liability for Char-Lynn's products was not disputed, this note's discussion of
the case will, for the sake of simplicity, treat Eaton as the actual maker of the tractor.
33 Id. at 25.
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motion. 36 The court, in granting FWG's summary judgment motion, observed
that Eaton was at fault in not having the records necessary to establish which of
the two component parts suppliers has sold it the drag link adapter." The court
also noted that one of the component parts suppliers was presumably as
blameless as the plaintiff." The Wetzel court therefore found no basis upon
which to require that each of the component parts makers disprove respon-
sibility for the faulty drag link adapter." Since the burden thus remained on
Eaton to prove that FWG, the movant, had actually produced the adapter
complained of, and since Eaton had failed to offer any evidence on the matter,
FWG was granted summary judgment.
The Gray court apparently viewed Wetzel as a relevant example of the
"fundamental principle of products liability law that a plaintiff must prove, as
an essential element of his case, that a defendant manufacturer actually made
the particular product which caused injury."" Without any recognition or
analysis of possibly important factual differences between Wetzel and the case at
bar, the Gray court applied the identification requirement to the plaintiff.'" The
Gray court gave no indication that it recognized any exceptions to the rule that
the plaintiff in a products liability case bears the burden of satisfying the iden-
tification requirement.
More searching analysis by the Gray court would have disclosed that the facts
of Wetzel were different from those of Gray in at least one important respect. In
Wetzel, the party opposing the summary judgment motion was considered by
the court to be at fault for not having at hand the records needed to prove
whether the movant actually made the defective product in question. In Gray,
by contrast, the plaintiff could not have been considered at fault for not having
the information needed to identify the source of the DES that harmed her. As
previously discussed, 42 the large number of DES makers, the loss of crucial
records and testimony attributable to the long latency period of DES-related
ailments, and the decision of many pharmacists to fill a prescription for one
brand of DES with whatever brand they had on hand, contribute to burdening
DES plaintiffs with serious identification problems. Such identification prob-
lems are altogether different from, and more vexing than, those of a corpora-
tion seeking to identify which of two companies supplied it directly with a
defective piece of equipment.
While the factual difference of Wetzel and Gray renders the former a
dubious precedent for the latter, the holding of Gray, is, in the context of its par-
ticular facts, wholly defensible. The plaintiff in Gray had no knowledge as to the
36 Id.
37 Id. at 25, 30.
39 Id. at 30.
39 Id.
40 Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
4 ' Id.
92 See text and notes at notes 8-14 supra.
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source of the DES to which she had been exposed, yet she chose to sue only one
of many possible sources of that DES." This apparently arbitrary choice of a
defendant justified the Gray court's imposition of the identification requirement
on the plaintiff. Holding Lilly alone liable for the plaintiff's harm, absent some
proof that Lilly actually was the culpable producer, would have been capricious
and unfair, and would have established an undesirable precedent. No one
company should bear total responsibility for harm that might have been in-
flicted by any one of 100 or more drug manufacturers."
The Gray decision, while correct, should be firmly restricted to its facts and
should not be applied to most multiple-defendant DES cases. The plaintiff in a
DES case should not have to satisfy the identification requirement if three con-
ditions are met. First, the plaintiff must prove that all of the defendants she has
joined have acted tortiously in producing or marketing the drug. Second, the
plaintiff's joinder must be sufficiently comprehensive that it can be said that
one or more of the defendants most likely produced the DES that caused the
plaintiff's injury. Third, the plaintiff cannot fairly be considered at fault for not
being able to identify the maker of the DES that reached and harmed her. If
these three conditions are satisfied, the identification requirement should be
lifted from the plaintiff, for it is unfair to allow a group of tortfeasors who have
between them most likely caused the plaintiff harm, to "escape liability merely
because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has made it difficult
or impossible to prove which of them has caused the harm."'"
The equitable considerations that argue against general application of
Gray to multiple-defendant DES litigation are particularly important since the
precedential weight of Gray in relation to such litigation is not clear. The Gray
court denied recovery against Lilly because the plaintiff failed to present any
evidence indicating that Lilly had in fact made the specific dosages of DES in
question." The plaintiff, having sued only one DES manufacturer, did not
argue, and the court, therefore, did not consider, any possible theories of joint
liability by which the plaintiff could avoid the identification requirement.
Therefore, if viewed narrowly in terms of its particular facts, Gray in no way
disapproved the use of joint liability theories as a way for DES plaintiffs to cir-
cumvent the identification requirement in those cases where it is unfair to im-
pose upon them the burden of that requirement. At least one court, however,
apparently has interpreted Gray as standing for the proposition that failure to
identify the source of the DES at issue is in every case fatal to a products liabil-
ity claim." If such an expansive reading of the Gray decision is proper, Gray
" See text at note 26 supra.
44
 As to the varying estimates of the number of DES producers, see note 8 supra.
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 433B, Comment f (1965).
46 See text at notes 27-29 supra.
4 ' The Supreme Court of California characterized a DES case that it was considering, a
case with eleven named drug company defendants, as another attempt to overcome the obstacle
to recovery that Gray and similar cases had placed in the way of DES plaintiffs. The California
court drew no distinction between the case it was considering and Gray based upon the number of
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represents an unduly harsh and rigid response to the identification problems
faced by most DES plaintiffs."
Two propositions concerning the decision in Gray v. United States are thus
suggested. First, the decision should be applied only to those DES cases in
which the plaintiff, unable to identify the source of her mother's DES, sues on-
ly one or a very few manufacturers. In most such cases, the plaintiffs choice of
defendants would be clearly arbitrary and, therefore, she should not be relieved
of her identification burden. Second, if the Gray decision is instead read as ap-
plying to all DES cases, without regard for the comprehensiveness of the
joinder of defendant manufacturers in each case, it is an unfair decision that
takes inadequate account of the monumental identification impediments con-
fronting most DES plaintiffs. Indiscriminate application of the identification
requirement to all DES plaintiffs would be an admission that the common law
of torts, contrary to historical experience, is a captive of established rules and
forms, unable to adapt itself to new and varied situations to which the con-
siderations that gave rise to those rules and forms are inapposite.
II. THE MICHIGAN APPROACH:
CONCERTED ACTION AND A LTERNATIVE  LIABILITY
Courts unwilling to impose upon DES plaintiffs the heavy burden of the
identification requirement have recognized or formulated at least three theories
that allow the plaintiff to recover without identifying the source of the DES that
harmed her. This section considers two of these theories, concerted action and
alternative liability. The theory of concerted action, briefly stated, provides
that all those who render substantial assistance or encouragement to another in
the latter's tortious conduct are jointly and severally liable with him for the
consequences of the resulting tort." It will be argued that while the theory of
concerted action is intended to deter and punish hazardous or otherwise anti-
social group behavior by extending the scope of persons liable for a given tort,
it in no way relieves the plaintiff of the burden of identifying the direct and im-
mediate cause of his harm. It will also be contended that the theory of con-
certed action requires proof of a degree of cooperation between the defendant
drug companies that the plaintiffs may not be able to supply.
While the theory of concerted action apparently presupposes the ability of
the plaintiff to satisfy the identification requirement," the theory of alternative
liability does not. Under this theory, where the plaintiff, through no fault of his
own, cannot identify which member of a group of tortfeasors caused him harm,
the burden of proof on the issue of causation is shifted to the defendants. Any
defendant unable to prove that his conduct, while tortious, did not in fact cause
the plaintiff harm, is jointly and severally liable with those of his co-defendants
defendants joined in each case. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597 n.8, 607 P.2d 924,
927-28 n.8, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135-36 n.8, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
45 See text and notes at notes 8-14 supra.
49 See, e.g., W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS S 46 (4th ed. 1971).
5G See text and notes at notes 93-97 infra.
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who are similarly unable to meet their burden of persuasion. 5 ' While in most
respects the theory of alternative liability appears to be tailor-made for applica-
tion to the DES cases, one facet of the theory — its requirement that all of the
actors who reasonably could have caused the plaintiff's harm must be joined as
defendants — renders the theory of little practical utility in DES litigation. 52
A. The Concerted Action Theory in DES Cases
According to section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there are
three kinds of factual patterns to which the concerted action theory may be ap-
plied." In the first of these, the defendant has acted together with others pur-
suant to a common tortious plan or design." For example, A, B, C, and D
come together to E's house with the intention of committing a robbery. A
breaks down E's front door; B ties up E; C beats him; and D steals E's proper-
ty. A, B, C, and D are, under the concerted action theory, jointly and severally
liable for all of the damages caused by their trespass to land, false imprison-
ment, battery, and conversion. 55 Since all who act in concert are jointly and
severally liable for the harm they cause," E can recover all of his damages from
any one or more of the defendants, leaving them to apportion among
themselves their individual shares of E's award according to the rules govern-
ing contribution in the relevant state."
In the second type of fact pattern to which the theory of concert applies,
the defendant has given substantial assistance or encouragement to another,
knowing that the latter's conduct was tortious." For example, A and B take
part in a riot. While throwing no rocks himself, B urges A to throw them. One
of the rocks thrown by A strikes C, a bystander. Both A and B are liable to C."
As another example, A, a police officer, advises other officers to illegally
physically coerce B. A will be liable to B for any batteries committed by those
other officers pursuant to A's advice. 60 In sum, where D1 renders to D2
assistance or encouragement that proves to be a substantial factor in causing
D2 to act in a manner that D1 knows to be tortious, D1 will be jointly and
severally liable with D2 for the resulting tort. 6 '
" See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 433B(3) (1965).
52 See text and notes at notes 160-66 infra.
53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 876 (1979).
5" Id., 5 876(a).
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 876, Comment a, Illustration 1 (1979).
56 See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1950); Abel v. Eli
Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979). See also Prosser,joint Torts and
Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 429 (1937).
57 For a definition of joint and several liability, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (5th
ed. 1979).
3" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 876(b) (1979).
59 Id., Illustration 4.
60 Id., Illustration 5.
61 Id., Comment d.
May 19811	 DES	 757
Third, the Restatement indicates that the concerted action theory applies
where the defendant's conduct, while rendering substantial assistance to
another in accomplishing a tortious result, is actionable not merely because it
assisted another in acting tortiously, but also because such conduct, considered
separately, itself constitutes a breach of duty to the plaintiff. 62 For instance, in
Guillory v. Godfrey," one defendant constantly harassed and insulted the
customers of the plaintiffs' restaurant in an attempt to force the plaintiffs to
dismiss their negro cook." The other defendant not only encouraged and sup-
ported the first defendant's actions but, on occasion, insulted the customers
himself with the same purpose in mind. 65 As a result, instead of each defendant
being held individually liable for his own tortious acts, the court found that the
defendants, having acted in concert to maliciously interfere with the plaintiff's
business, were jointly and severally liable for all of the harm suffered by the
plaintiffs. 66 The second defendant's conduct, while tortious in and of itself, was
apparently viewed by the Guillory court as rendering so much encouragement
to the first defendant's tortious activity, that the two could fairly be considered
to be acting in concert in attempting to destroy the plaintiffs' business. In this
third type of fact situation, an actor whose tortious conduct renders substantial
assistance or encouragement to another tortfeasor will be jointly and severally
liable with the other tortfeasor even if the first defendant did not know that his
acts or the acts of the other defendant were tortious. 67
A survey of the cases indicates that while the concerted action theory has
been most frequently applied to the clearly cooperative efforts of a small
number of persons committing a rather simple intentional or negligent tort,"
the theory has not been confined within such narrow factual or legal
parameters. While commonly applied to cases where two or more persons have
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 876(c) (1979).
" 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 632-33, 286 P.2d 474, 476-77 (1955).
6+ Id. at 630-31, 286 P.2d at 476-77.
65 Id. at 631, 286 P.2d at 476-77.
66 Id. at 632-33, 286 P.2d at 477-78.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 876, Comment e (1979).
66 For cases where a few persons committed a simple intentional tort, see text and notes
at notes 69-71 infra.
A common application of the theory of concerted action to negligent defendants has been
in the context of automobile races. Sec, e.g., Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d 591, 596, 5
Cal. Rptr. 534, 537 (1960); Biercynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968), In the typical
case, X, Y, and Z are racing on a public way, either as a result of an explicit agreement or a tacit
understanding that may be inferred from their conspicuously parallel conduct. See, e.g., Biercyn-
ski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1968) (agreement or understanding to race inferred from
evidence that the defendants' automobiles were travelling side by side at twice the legal speed).
While the race is in progress, X strikes P, an innocent bystander, with his vehicle, causing injury
to P. X, under traditional principles of causation, is clearly liable as the cause of P's injuries. If
the concerted action theory is applied to this situation, Y and Z, whose vehicles never came in
contact with P, will be jointly and severally liable with X for P's injuries. Under the theory, all
those drivers participating in the race at the time that X struck P are viewed as factual causes of
P's harm, so all share liability for it.
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acted together in perpetrating a battery, 69 false imprisonment or arrest," or
malicious interference with another's business," the theory of concerted action
has also been utilized in cases involving an illegal strike, 72
 an illegal boycott,"
securities fraud, 74 intentional breach of an implied contract," misuse of cor-
porate funds," and an assault involving seventy-five to eighty men."
Therefore, any refusal to apply the concerted action theory to DES cases must
rest on grounds other than their mere factual or legal complexity.
In Abel v. Eli Lilly and Company," the plaintiffs, many of whom were unable
to satisfy the identification requirement, claimed that the sixteen defendant
drug makers had acted in concert to produce and market dangerous products
— DES and similar synthetic estrogens — without adequate testing or warn-
ings. 79
 At trial, the judge ruled that each plaintiff was required to identify
which of the defendants actually produced the DES or other synthetic estrogen
to which he or she was exposed." Those plaintiffs who did not satisfy the iden-
tification requirement had summary judgment of no cause of action entered
against them.'" Those plaintiffs who did allege that a particular defendant
made the DES to which they were exposed had their claims against all the other
defendants dismissed. 62 Finally, the plaintiffs' concerted action claims were
dismissed as to all of the defendants."
On review, the Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed the trial court,
ruling that the plaintiffs had stated a legally sufficient claim under the con-
certed action theory." The appeals court declared that the concerted action
theory was well-established in Michigan decisional law, and supported this
observation by referring to the case of McCoy v. Deliefde."
69 E.g., Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950); Gutowski v. City of New
Britain, 165 Conn. 50, 327 A.2d 552 (1973); King v. Herfurth, 306 Mich, 444, 11 N.W.2d 198
(1943); Francis v. Kane, 246 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App, 1951).
70 	Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho
364, 42 P.2d 297 (1935); King v. Herfurth, 306 Mich. 444, 11 N.W.2d 198 (1943).
7 ' Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955).
72
 Tompkins v. Sullivan, 309 Mass. 496, 500, 34 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1941).
73 Dinoffria v. Teamsters Local 179, 331 Ill. App. 129, 143, 72 N.E.2d 635, 641
(1947), appeal dismissed, 399 Ill. 304, 77 N.E.2d 661, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 815 (1948).
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975) (liability for aiding
and abetting a securities law violation may be imposed where the elements of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS S 876(b) are present). See also Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 620-21 (1972) (discussing the role of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS $ 876 in securities law).
" Mead Corp. v. Mason, 191 So.2d 592, 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
76
 flux v. Butler, 339 F.2d 696, 699-701 (6th Cir. 1964).
77
 Meints v. Huntington, 276 F. 245, 248 (8th Cir. 1921).
78
 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
79 Id. at 71-72, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
" 0 Id. at 66, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
a' Id. at 68, 289 N.W.2d at 23.
82 Id.
" 3 Id.
" Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
83 376 Mich. 198, 135 N,W.2d 916 (1965).
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In McCoy, three persons had been hunting together in a corn field in which
it was difficult to see." One of the hunters accidentally shot and wounded the
plaintiff." Although the plaintiff was able to identify the defendant who shot
him," the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the other two hunters, who
had not shot the plaintiff, could also be held liable if the plaintiff could prove
that they had acted in concert with the defendant who did do the damage. 89
The appeals court in Abel read McCoy as standing for the proposition that if two
or more persons acting in concert negligently harm the plaintiff, all of the
defendants are liable even though only one of them directly caused the
plaintiff's harm. 9°
While the Abel court correctly interpreted the rule of law underlying Mc-
Coy, it failed to recognize that McCoy was quite distinguishable from Abel. In
McCoy, the plaintiff was able to identify the direct and immediate cause of his
harm. 9 ' Many of the plaintiffs in Abel, by contrast, were unable to make such
identifications. 92 The use made of the concerted action theory in McCoy was
therefore fundamentally different from the use of concert endorsed in Abel. In
McCoy, the court used the theory to extend liability to those rendering substan-
tial assistance and encouragement to a tortfeasor whose causal contribution to
the plaintiff's harm had been established. In Abel, contrariwise, the court ap-
proved use of the concerted action theory as a vehicle through which the plain-
tiffs could avoid having to prove that a particular defendant actually caused
them harm. Therefore, the Abel court's reliance on McCoy as precedential sup-
port for its rather novel use of the concerted action theory was misplaced.
The concerted action theory apparently was developed to discourage
hazardous or otherwise undesirable group behavior by expanding the scope of
persons liable for a given tort." It was not created to aid those plaintiffs that are
unable to determine which member of a group of tortfeasors in fact caused
them harm. It is not surprising, therefore, that a survey of the cases" reveals
that the concerted action theory has been used almost exclusively — as it was
used in McCoy — to extend liability to those acting in league with a tortfeasor
identified by the plaintiff as a factual cause of his harm. 95 The theory rarely has
86 Id. at 202-04, 135 N.W.2d at 918-19.
" Id. at 203, 135 N.W.2d at 918.
as Id.
89 Id. at 205-08, 135 N.W.2d at 919-21.
99 Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 72-73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (1979).
9 ' See text at note 88 supra.
9 ' Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 66-67, 289 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1979).
93 FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 979.
9* See cases contained in notes 68-77 supra.
93 See text at notes 88-89 supra. Since the concerted action theory almost always has
been applied to situations in which the direct and immediate cause of the plaintiff's harm was
identified, it is at least arguable that merely showing cooperation among a group of actors, at
least one of whom probably caused the plaintiff harm, is insufficient to make out a claim of con-
cert. Rather, the plaintiff pleading concerted action must initially show that at least one identified
actor tortiously has caused him harm. This tortfeasor may be called the hub of the tort. To this
identified hub may then be joined, for the purpose of imposing joint and several liability, all those
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been used to help plaintiffs circumvent the identification requirement. 96 In-
deed, outside the DES area, no products liability case has been found that
authorizes the use of the concerted action theory in order to allow a plaintiff to
avoid the identification requirement."
In addition to presupposing the ability of the plaintiff to identify the direct
and immediate cause of his harm, the concerted action theory requires proof of
a substantial degree of cooperation between the defendants." DES plaintiffs
may be unable, however, to prove that the drug companies that developed and
sold DES for use in preventing miscarriage acted pursuant to a common tor-
tious plan or that they substantially assisted or encouraged one another to
make and sell a defective product. 99 Thus, DES plaintiffs may lack a sufficient
factual basis for their claim of concerted action.
who substantially aided or encouraged the hub's tortious conduct. Without this hub linking the
group's tortious cooperation to the plaintiff's harm, a case of concerted action is not present.
96
 The only cases found which employ the concerted action theory to allow a plaintiff to
circumvent the need to "identify the cause of his harm, are cases involving the negligent use of
firearms by two or more persons. Sec, e.g., Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 453, 106 N.W. 1120,
1121 (1906); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 860, 110 So. 666, 668 (1926). It appears that the
concerted action theory was used in these cases because it was the only theory then available
under which liability could plausibly be imposed in the absence of the plaintiff's ability to identify
the party which actually caused his injury. For example, in Oliver, the court justified its finding
that the defendants had acted in concert in firing their rifles by observing that, if the two defend-
ants were not held to have acted in concert, the result would be "to exonerate both from liability,
although each [defendant) was negligent, and the injury resulted from such negligence." Id,
With the development of the alternative liability theory, see text at notes 107-14 infra, a
preferable theory of liability is now available for adjudication of cases such as Oliver, making
resort to the theory of concerted action unnecessary and unjustifiable.
99 In one products liability case, Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F.
Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the court, in response to a situation in which children injured by
defective blasting caps could not identify the maker of the caps, formulated a theory of liability
that incorporated elements of the theory of concerted action. The court in Hall held that the
plaintiffs could place upon each of the defendant explosives manufacturers the burden of disprov-
ing responsibility for the caps in question if the plaintiffs could first demonstrate that the blasting
cap producers had jointly controlled the risk created by their failure to place warnings on each
cap and by their failure to make the caps more difficult to detonate. Id. at 373-74. The Hall court
stated that two of the three ways that defendants' joint control of risk could be shown involved
demonstrating the kind of cooperation and common agfeement present in cases of concerted ac-
tion. Id. While the Hall theory thus resembled the theory of concert in certain respects, it differed
from the concerted action theory in that it would allow individual manufacturers to escape liabili-
ty upon a showing that while they did cooperate in a substantial manner with the firm that did in
fact produce the defective caps, they themselves did not manufacture any of those caps. When
applied to a products liability case, the theory of concert, on the contrary, would impose liability
not merely on the manufacturer or seller of the defective product causing the harm, but also on
all those parties that rendered substantial assistance or encouragement to the firm that made or
sold the defective product. See text at notes 53-67 supra.
99 See text at notes 53-67 supra.
99 Plaintiffs in the DES cases generally have been unsuccessful in suing on the theory
that DES manufacturers acted in concert to win FDA approval of DES as a treatment to prevent
miscarriage and in testing and marketing the drug. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d
588, 605, 607 P.2d 924, 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980)
(plaintiff unable to allege a sufficient degree of cooperation between the defendant drug com-
panies to support a claim of concerted action); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super.
551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1315-16 (1990) (plaintiffs failed to allege any facts to support a finding
May 1981]	 DES	 761
A further objection to use of the concerted action theory in DES litigation
is that its imposition of joint and several liability often will result in an in-
equitable division of liability among defendant manufacturers. Many states
still allow contribution among tortfeasors held jointly and severally liable only
on an equal basis."° That is, in states that mandate equal contribution, each
judgment debtor's share of liability is determined by dividing the plaintiff's
recovery by the number of defendants held liable. Imposition of joint and
several liability on DES makers frequently will mean, therefore, that each
defendant manufacturer will share equally in the cost of any judgment awarded
to the plaintiff, regardless of whether that manufacturer produced 90, 50, 25,
or 0 percent of the DES that the plaintiff's mother might have taken."' An
equal division of liability among firms with such widely differing shares of the
market from which the plaintiff's mother obtained her DES is unfair.
Therefore, to the extent that use of the concerted action theory by DES plain-
tiffs will result in an equal division of liability among manufacturers with
disparate market shares, its use in DES litigation is undesirable.
In summary, the theory of concerted action should not be used by courts
to help plaintiffs avoid the adverse legal consequences of their inability to iden-
tify the manufacturers of the specific units of DES that allegedly harmed them.
The theory was not devised to allow plaintiffs to avoid the identification re-
quirement, rather it was developed to deter dangerous or otherwise unaccept-
able group behavior.'" The theory of concert, furthermore, has evidently
never been used in a non-DES products liability case to help the plaintiff skirt
the identification requirement.'" As well, DES plaintiffs may be unable to
prove the degree of collaboration between the defendant DES makers that the
theory of concerted action requires.'" Finally, to the extent that the concerted
action theory will, when filtered through the contribution laws of many states,
that the defendants acted in concert to obtain approval from the FDA, in 1947, to market DES as
a treatment to prevent miscarriage). Contra, Bichler v. Eli Lilly and Co., N.Y. Times, March 1,
1981, at 34, col. 1 (plaintiff recovered $500,000 after proving that the defendant acted in concert
with other drug companies in obtaining FDA approval to sell DES and in marketing it without
adequately testing it. Judgment and award affirmed on appeal by the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division).
'°° See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. SS 09.16.010-09.16.020 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, S
17 (1980 Supp.), as construed in Lahocki v. Contee Sand and Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579,
621, 398 A.2d 490, 514 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 23IB, 5 2 (Law. Co-op 1974); MICH.
STAT. ANN. 55 27A.2925(1)-27A.2925(2) (Callaghan 1980); MISS. CODE ANN. S 85-5-5 (1973);
N.M. STAT. ANN. S 41-3-2 (1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. S 1B-2 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE 5
32-38-02 (1976).
'°' Since all who act in concert with a party that tortiously harms the plaintiff are jointly
and severally liable with that party, see text and note at note 56 supra, a manufacturer that could
prove that it did not produce the DES which allegedly harmed the plaintiff would nevertheless be
liable if concert between it and the DES maker that actually did supply the DES in question was
shown.
102 See text at note 93 supra.
103 See text and note at note 97 supra.
104 Sec text and note at note 99 supra.
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such as Michigan,'°5
 apportion liability equally among defendant DES
manufacturers with differing market shares, it allocates liability unfairly and ir-
rationally. ID6
 It is for these reasons that, while the inability of a plaintiff to iden-
tify the source of the DES that her mother ingested should not as a general rule
bar her claim, the theory of concerted action is an inappropriate vehicle
through which to allow her to proceed with her case. Another, more ap-
propriate, theory should be utilized to allow DES plaintiffs to avoid the iden-
tification requirement.
B. The Alternative Liability Theory in DES Cases.
Unlike the theory of concerted action, the alternative liability theory was
developed precisely to address situations in which the plaintiff is faultlessly
unable to identify which member of a group of tortfeasor actually caused him
harm.'" The theory was first recognized in the case of Summers v. Tice.'" In
Summers, two hunters negligently and simultaneously shot in the plaintiff's
direction, leaving him with an eye injury that could have been caused'° 9 by
only one of the two hunters."° Because of the nature of the defendants' con-
duct, however, neither the defendants nor the plaintiff could determine which
hunter had done the damage."' In response to the plaintiff's predicament, the
Supreme Court of California ruled that where the plaintiff's harm is the result
of the independent acts of one of two negligent tortfeasors, and where, through
no.fault of his own, the plaintiff cannot prove which tortfeasor caused the in-
jury, the burden of proof on the issue of causation shifts to the defendants. " 2
Once the burden of proof on the issue of causation shifts, both of the defend-
ants will be held jointly and severally liable unless one of them can prove that
' 05
 See Michigan equal division contribution statute contained in note 100 supra.
156 See text at note 101 supra. Of course, this argument is in part a criticism of contribu-
tion rules which divide liability equally among judgment debtors rather than an objection to the
theory of concerted action. In those states permitting contribution on a comparative fault or
causation basis, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN 34-1002(4) (1947), imposition of joint and several
liability upon defendant DES makers is less inequitable since, presumably, liability in such states
will be apportioned between DES makers roughly according to their respective market shares.
Sec, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316 (1980)
(court held that each defendant's market share would determine its contribution rights and
liabilities under New Jersey's comparative negligence contribution statute). The imposition of
joint and several liability, however, raises the possibility that solvent DES manufacturers will pay
more than their fair share of liability in the event that any of their codefendants default on their
judgment obligation. See text at note 57 supra, In this respect, imposition of joint and several
liability in DES cases is undesirable and unfair regardless of the manner in which the governing
contribution statute allocates liability between the defendants.
'° 7 See text at notei 108-14 infra.
108 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
I"
 "Caused" is here used in the logical sense of firing the shot that struck the plaintiff's
eye, it is not used in the technical sense of factual or legal (proximate) cause. As to the distinction
between factual and legal cause, see W PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS SS 41.42 (4th ed. 1971).
"° Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 84, 199 P.2d 1, 3 (1948).
"' Id. at 84, 86, 199 P.2d at 3-4.
" 2 Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
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he did not cause the injury.'" The court justified placing this burden on the
defendants by observing that both defendants were wrongdoers toward the
plaintiff, and that by the nature of their tortious conduct, they made it impossi-
ble for the plaintiff to identify which of them actually caused his injury."' Sum-
mers, therefore, reflects a policy determination that where a plaintiff has suf-
fered harm as a result of the tortious conduct of two or more members of a
group of tortfeasors, but is faultlessly unable to pinpoint the culpable party, the
burden of proof on the question of which tortfeasor in fact caused that harm
should be placed upon the tortfeasors rather than upon the blameless plaintiff.
An analogous situation was presented in Anderson v. Somberg," 5 wherein
the Supreme Court of New Jersey formulated a theory that is similar to the
Summers alternative liability theory. In Anderson, the plaintiff was harmed when
part of a surgical tool broke off and lodged in his spine during an operation.
The plaintiff sued the surgeon and the hospital where the surgery was per-
formed for negligence, the distributor of the tool for breach of warranty, and
the maker of the tool on a theory of strict liability in tort. 16 The jury returned
verdicts in favor of all four defendants."'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and ordered a new trial."'
The court ruled that where an unconscious plaintiff suffers an injury that was
not a foreseeable risk of competently performed surgery, all those who either
had custody of the unconscious plaintiff, or for other reasons owed him a duty
of care, must prove their non-culpability or suffer the imposition of liability." 9
Since, in the New Jersey Supreme Court's view, all of the parties that might
have been responsible for the plaintiff's injury had been joined,' 20 the court
reasoned that at least one of the defendants could not absolve itself of
liability."' The court therefore ruled that at the new trial which it had ordered,
the plaintiff would be entitled to an instruction that would require the jury to
return a verdict against at least one of the defendants.I 22 In reaching this result,
the Anderson court did not employ the theory of alternative liability, rather it ap-
plied a theory "akin" to res ipso loquitur. 123
Id. at 86-88, 199 P.2d at 4-5.
14 Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
"' 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d I, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
116 Id. at 295, 338 A.2d at 3.
' 7 Id. at 297, 338 A.2d at 4.
" 8 Id. at 305, 338 A.2d at 8.
Id. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5.
1 " Id. at 296, 338 A.2d at 4.
12 ' Id. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7.
122 Id, at 304, 338 A.2d at 8.
123 Id. at 299, 338 A.2d at 5. The theory of res ipsa loquitur can, in appropriate cases,
support an inference that the plaintiff was injured because the defendant acted negligently,
although the plaintiff cannot directly prove such negligence, Generally, the plaintiff, in order to
invoke the theory, must demonstrate that: (1) the event or injury complained of is of a kind that
usually does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the event or injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the (exclusive) control of the defendant; and (3) the event
or injury was not due to any voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff. See, e.g., W. PROSSER,
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The Anderson and Summers theories are different in an important respect.
Under the Anderson theory, the defendants labor under a presumption of both
tortious conduct and causation of the plaintiff's injury that, if not rebutted,
supports the imposition of liability. 124
 Contrariwise, under the alternative
liability theory of Summers, the plaintiff is relieved only of the burden of proving
who in fact caused his injury. Before the shifting of the burden of proof on the
causation question, the plaintiff under the Summers theory must prove that each
of the defendants acted tortiously.'"
The Anderson and Summers theories, while different in this one respect, are
similar in two others. First, both Anderson and Summers rest on an implicit
recognition and endorsement of the principle that the placement of the burden
of proof on any given issue is a matter of policy and fairness. 126 Both cases and
theories thus stand as authority for the proposition that while, as a general rule,
a plaintiff bears the burden of identifying the party that caused him harm, this
rule is not without exceptions. Second, both cases present instances where it
was certain that one of the defendants caused the plaintiff's injury.'" For
reasons that will be presented below,'" it is unlikely that most DES plaintiffs
will be able to join in one action all of the firms that might have supplied the
DES that caused their injuries. It is doubtful, therefore, that many DES plain-
tiffs will be able to utilize the Summers alternative liability theory.
In Abel v. Eli Lilly and Company, 129 the plaintiffs claimed to have joined all
known manufacturers of the DES that was distributed in Michigan during the
period in which they were exposed to the drug.'" While not explicitly in-
dicating what, if any, significance it attached to the plaintiffs' claim of com-
prehensive joinder, the Abel court ruled that while the plaintiffs bear the burden
of proof on three elements of their claim,"' they do not bear the burden of
LAW OF TORTS S 39 (4th ed. 1971). The theory in Anderson was termed "akin" to res ipsa loquitur
because some of the defendants to which it was applied were not alleged to be negligent, but were
being sued on theories of breach of warranty or strict liability in tort. Anderson v. Somberg, 67
N.J. 291, 299-300, 338 A.2d I, 5, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
124 Id. at 301, 338 A.2d at 6. The Anderson court endorsed the view that each of the
defendants, in order to escape liability, would have to make an affirmative showing of: (1) a
definite cause for the plaintiff's harm in which no element of negligence, or otherwise tortious
conduct, on its part was involved; or (2) such care in all respects that the plaintiff's harm must
have been due to an unpreventable, albeit unknown cause. Since, in order to avoid liability, each
of the Anderson defendants was required to make a positive showing that: (1) its tortious conduct
did not cause the plaintiff's harm; or (2) its conduct was not tortious, the Anderson court clearly
was establishing a presumption that each defendant had acted tortiously and, in so doing, had
caused the plaintiff's injury.
' 25 See text at note 114 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 433B,
Comment f (1965).
126 See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCES 337 (2d ed. 1972); 9 J..WIGmORE,
EVIDENCE 5 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
127 See text at notes 110, 120 supra.
128 See text and notes at notes 160-64 infra.
129 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
135 Id. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
11 Id. at 76-77, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27. The Abel court listed the elements on which DES
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proving which specific firms made the units of DES to which they were ex-
posed.'" Rather, each defendant manufacturer is left free to avoid liability as
to some or all of the plaintiffs by proving that it did not make the DES to which
the plaintiff in question was exposed.' 33 The defendants also are allowed to im-
plead third parties for purposes of contribution or indemnification.' 31
While noting that there were no Michigan decisions directly supporting its
decision to allow DES plaintiffs to utilize the alternative liability theory, the
Abel court viewed the Michigan case of Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc.,'" as
supporting the relevant, albeit general, proposition that the burden of proof on
the issue of causation may be shifted to defendants that have acted
wrongfully) 36 In Snider, the plaintiff was injured when the brakes on his truck
failed)" Prior to the brake failure, the plaintiff on numerous occasions had
reported brake trouble to, and had his brakes serviced by, the dealer from
whom he had purchased the truck)" The plaintiff sued both the truck's
manufacturer, Ford, and the dealer, Thibodeau.' 39 The court directed a ver-
dict for Ford and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Thibodeau)"
The court of appeals reversed the directed verdict in favor of Ford but af-
firmed the jury verdict for Thibodeau, ordering a new trial of the plaintiff's
claims against Ford."' In dictum, the court of appeals, hypothecating the
presence of both defendants at retrial rather than just Ford, stated that if the
jury were to conclude that the plaintiff had been injured as a result of defective
brakes, the burden of "negating individual responsibility for the brake failure"
would be on both of the defendants."' If neither defendant could meet that
burden, the Snider court's dictum seemed to indicate that both would be held
liable.
The shifting of the burden of proof hypothetically envisioned by the Snider
plaintiffs still bear the burden of proof as (1) showing that each defendant breached his duty of
care in producing DES (or other, similar synthetic estrogens); (2) showing that plaintiff's harm
was caused by her mother's ingestion of DES; and (3) showing that one or more of the named
defendants manufactured the DES ingested. Id.
1 " Id. at 77, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
"3 Id. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26.
"4 Id. The Abel court's allowance for the impleading of third parties would seem to in-
dicate that not all possible sources of the offending DES must be joined in order for plaintiffs to
make use of the alternative liability theory. If all possible sources of the drug must be joined in
order for plaintiffs to utilize the alternative liability theory, there presumably would be no parties
left to implead. The ability to implead third parties, extended by the Abel court, would therefore
be of value only if the court was willing to shift the burden of proof even in the absence of a com-
prehensive joinder of defendants.
1 " 42 Mich. App. 708, 202 N.W.2d 727 (1972).
"5 Abel v. Eli Lilly and.Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 74, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979).
" 7 Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 711-12, 202 N.W.2d 727,
729 (1972).
138 Id. at 715, 202 N.W.2d at 731.
1S9 Id. at 712, 202 N.W.2d at 729.
"0 Id.
14 ' Id. at 721, 202 N.W.2d at 734.
"2 Id. at 719, 202 N.W.2d at 733.
766	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 22:747
court was more drastic, and rested on less compelling grounds, than that ap-
proved in Abel. First, the Snider court's dictum approved shifting to each of the
defendants the burden of proof on both the question of whether it had acted tor-
tiously and whether it had caused the plaintiff's harm.'" The burden-shifting
approved in Abel, by contrast, was less far-reaching as it involved only the
question of causation. The plaintiffs in Abel still bore the burden of proving that
each of the defendants acted tortiously in producing or selling DES. 144
 Second,
in Abel it was alleged that all of the defendants had acted tortiously in making
and marketing DES without adequately testing the drug or warning of its
dangers.'" In Snider, contrariwise, the court was willing, in dictum, to shift the
burden of proof to both defendants despite the fact that only one of the defend-
ants, apparently, had acted tortiously toward the plaintiff.'" Where, as in
Snider, one of the defendants is presumably not a wrongdoer, the equitable con-
siderations favoring a shifting of the burden of proof to the defendants are
much less compelling than in cases such as Abel, where all of the defendants are
apparently wrongdoers and the only uncertainty is which wrongdoer actually
caused the plaintiff's injury. The shifting of the burden of proof authorized in
Abel was therefore in a sense supported by dictum in Snider, in that the burden-
shifting hypothecated in the latter case was more far-reaching, and rested on
less persuasive equitable grounds, than that in Abel.
Another case relied on by the Abel court in allowing the plaintiffs to avail
themselves of the alternative liability theory was Maddox v. Donaldson.'" In
Maddox, the plaintiffs were injured when the automobile in which they were
riding was struck in rapid succession by two other vehicles.'" The plaintiffs
sued the drivers of both vehicles.' 49
 Later, however, they discontinued the case
against the driver of the automobile that first struck them,"° apparently
because his insurance carrier was insolvent. 15 ' The trial court subsequently
' 4 ' Id. The phrase "burden of negating individual responsiblity for the brake failure"
appears to encompass both the question of tortious conduct and the question of causation. Thus,
the Snider court appeared to be indulging in the same kind of two-pronged presumption that was
employed by the Anderson court. See text and note at note 124 supra. That is, the Snider court's dic-
tum seemed to be approving a presumption that would cast upon each of the defendants the
burden of proving either that it did not act.tortiously in manufacturing, installing, or servicing
the plaintiff's brakes, or that any such tortious conduct was not a cause of the subsequent brake
failure. In the absence of such an affirmative exculpatory showing, the Snider court appeared
ready to presume that each of the defendants had acted tortiously and, as a result of that tortious
conduct, had caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
114 See text and note at note 131 supra.
145 See text at note 79 supra.
' 46
 Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 718, 202 N.W.2d 727,
732 (1972). The Snider court considered this a case of "proving which of two possible
wrongdoers" was responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries. This indicates that it was, in the court's
view, likely that only one of the two defendants had acted wrongfully or tortiously toward the
plaintiff. Thus, one of the defendants in Snider was in all likelihood not a wrongdoer at all.
'" 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
'sa Id. at 427, 108 N.W.2d at 34.
149 Id.
150 Id.
191
 Id. at 437, 108 N.W.2d at 39.
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dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the driver of the second automobile
because it found the driver of the plaintiffs' automobile to be guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law and because the portion of the plaintiffs'
damages caused by the second defendant driver could not be determined. 162
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the
case for a new trial.' 63 The court rejected the trial court's conclusion that the
second driver was entitled to a dismissal because his causal contribution to the
plaintiffs' damages, if any, could not be isolated from the damages caused by
the first driver. 154 The Maddux court ruled that in order to recover, the plaintiffs
did not have to prove how much of their damages were caused by each of the
two collisions. 156 The Maddux court more generally held that where a plaintiff's
injuries, although caused by two or more independent tortfeasors, are of an in-
divisible nature, all those contributing to such injuries are jointly and severally
liable for all the damage done."6
The majority in Abel justified their reliance on Maddux by declaring that
Abel, like Maddux, essentially was concerned with apportioning damages among
proven wrongdoers.'" The Abel dissent pointed out, however, that this conclu-
sion ignored the question of causation.'" In Maddux, the plaintiffs identified
the tortfeasors that caused them harm, whereas many of the plaintiffs in Abel
did not make such an identification.'" Thus, the only uncertainty in Maddux
was the correct apportionment of liability among defendants who had definitely
contributed to the plaintiffs' harm. The situation in Abel, however, was quite
different. Many of the Abel plaintiffs were unable to identify which defendants
had actually caused them harm, a step that precedes the need to determine the
correct apportionment of liability among multiple causes of one's harm.
Therefore, Maddux, concerned as it was with a very different issue than that
presented to the Abel court, is of little relevance to the question that was central
to Abel: when and if the burden of proof on the causation issue should be shifted
to the defendants in DES suits.
The plaintiffs' claim in Abel that they had joined all possible sources of the
DES to which they were exposed' 6° would, if in fact true, make Abel a seeming-
152 Id. at 427, 108 N.W.2d at 34.
'" Id. at 436, 108 N.W.2d at 38.
' 54 Id. at 429-35, 108 N.W.2d at 35-38.
'"
156 Id. at 432-34, 108 N.W.2d at 37.
'" Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 76, 289 N.W.2d 20, 26 (1979).
' 58 Id. at 87, 289 N.W.2d at 31 (Moore, J., dissenting). The dissent in Abel stated that
cases such as Madder,
which shift the burden of proof to the defendant's] do not involve the problem of
identifying the party who is liable, but rather, they involve the apportionment of
damages after liability is proven. . . . In the case at bar [Abel, the basic issue has to
do with establishing liability by identifying the particular wrongdoer(s), rather than
with apportioning the damages among the tortfeasors. [emphasis in the originall
Id.
'" See text at note 79 supra.
' 6° See text at note 130 supra.
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ly appropriate case to which to apply the alternative liability theory. Abel is
unusual, however, in its putatively comprehensive joinder of defendants. It
will likely prove to be impossible for plaintiffs in most DES cases to achieve the
kind of exhaustive joinder apparently present in Abel. There are three principal
reasons for this difficulty. First, the number of possibly culpable DES pro-
ducers in any given case is potentially enormous. It has been estimated that at
one time or another between 94 and 300 companies made DES for use in
pregnancy.' 6 ' Second, some of the original manufacturers of the drug are no
longer in existence, having been liquidated, reorganized under new names, or
merged with other concerns.' 62 It is not clear, furthermore, in the case of the
mergers, that the surviving corporations are liable for the defective products of
the merged corporations.' 63 Third, in some cases, not all of the firms that
might have supplied the DES in question will be amenable to suit in the forum
state.'"
As one commentator has observed, the alternative liability theory rests
upon a policy determination that there are times when the usual requirement
that the plaintiff show at least a greater-than-fifty percent likelihood that a par-
ticular defendant caused him harm may be relaxed in favor of a one hundred
percent chance that one or more members of a group of tortfeasors caused that
harm. 165 If it will not be possible for most DES plaintiffs to join in one action all
possible sources of the DES that harmed them, and if courts continue to insist
upon such comprehensive joinder as a prerequisite to the invocation of the
alternative liability theory,' 66 the theory will be of no help to most DES plain-
tiffs.
As between the two joint liability theories considered, however, the alter-
native liability theory is for two reasons more appropriate for use in DES litiga-
tion than is the concerted action theory. First, under the theory of concerted ac-
tion, DES plaintiffs must prove some degree of cooperation, understanding, or
agreement between the defendant drug makers.' 67 Often, plaintiffs will be
161 FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 964 n.3.
162 Id. at 984 n.114,
162 Id.
166 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
166 FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 986.
166 At least two courts have explicitly ruled on the question whether the alternative
liability theory is available to DES plaintiffs only where all possible sources of the DES in ques-
tion are before the court. In Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980), the Supreme Court of California ruled that the
alternative liability theory was not available to the plaintiff because she had failed to join all of the
possible sources of the DES to which she had been exposed. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39. By contrast, in Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N. J. Super 551, 420
A.2d 1305 (1980), a NewJersey trial court ruled that the alternative liability theory was available
to DES plaintiffs, even in situations in which not all possible sources of the drug are joined by the
plaintiff. Id. at ____, 420 A.2d at 1314-15.
167
 See text at notes 53-67.
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unable to supply such evidence of agreement or collaboration. 168 The alter-
native liability theory, by contrast, is founded upon the assumption that the
tortfeasors acted independently of each other, and therefore requires no proof
of cooperation or agreement among the defendants. 168 Second, the concerted
action theory was not designed to aid plaintiffs that are unable to satisfy the
identification requirement. The theory was instead meant to discourage
dangerous or otherwise undesirable group behavior.' 20 This distinguishes the
concerted action theory from the alternative liability theory, which was
developed precisely to address situations in which a plaintiff is unable to iden-
tify the tortfeasor who caused him harm."' For these reasons, the theory of
alternative liability is preferable to the theory of concerted action in the context
of those DES cases in which the plaintiff cannot satisfy the identification re-
quirement. Both theories, however, are deficient for use in DES litigation in-
sofar as they will, in those states providing for equal contribution, 12 apportion
liability equally among defendant manufacturers with widely differing shares
of the relevant DES market. In this regard, the Supreme Court of California
has engaged in some salutary innovation, which shall be explored in the follow-
ing section.
III. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH: THE MARKET SHARE THEORY
When the Supreme Court of California first considered the DES iden-
tification problem, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 19 it had the benefit of being
able to consider both the Gray and Abel responses to the problem. The Sindell
court rejected the approaches adopted in Gray and Abel, concluding that while
insistence on plaintiff's satisfaction of the identification requirement was too
harsh,'74 neither the concerted action' nor the alternative liability 16 theory
was a proper vehicle by which DES plaintiffs could avoid that requirement. In-
stead, the California Supreme Court formulated a new theory for use in the
DES cases: the market share theory. Under the market share theory, a plaintiff
can avoid the identification requirement without having to prove that the
defendants cooperated in testing and marketing DES, and without having to
join every last possible source of the DES to which she was exposed.
In Sindell, the plaintiff, unable to satisfy the identification requirement,
165
	
note 99 supra.
169 For a lucid and instructive contrast of the theories of concerted action and alter-
native liability in this regard, see Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73-74, 289 N.W.2d
20, 25 (1979).
"° See text and notes at notes 93-97 supra.
"' See text at notes 108-14 supra.
172 See collection of equal division contribution statutes at note 100 supra.
1 " 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270
(1980).
174 Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
"5 Id. at 603-06, 607 P.2d at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41.
170 Id. at 598-603, 607 P.2d at 928-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-39.
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brought suit against eleven named drug companies and one hundred John
Does on behalf of herself and other women similarly situated.'" The defend-
ants demurred to the complaint, apparently on the ground that the plaintiff
could not identify which defendant had manufactured the drug responsible for
her injuries. 175
 The trial court granted the demurrers and dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice because of the plaintiff's inability to satisfy the identifica-
tion requirement.'"
The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the
plaintiff's failure to satisfy the identification requirement necessarily denied her
an opportunity to recover for her harm.' 80
 After concluding that Sindell could
not state a claim based upon the theories of concerted action, 1 e' alternative
liability, 182 or "industry-wide liability,'' 83
 a narrowly and bitterly divided
court fashioned a new theory under which the plaintiff might prevail, the
market share theory.
The market share theory provided that if a plaintiff, unable to identify the
source of her mother's DES, joined as defendants manufacturers that together
accounted for a "substantial" share of the DES that her mother might have
taken, the burden of proof on the issue of which firm actually produced the of-
fending DES would be lifted from the plaintiff and placed upon the
defendants.'" The defendants would be allowed to implead other manufac-
turers that might have supplied some or all of the DES in question. 185 Any one
or more of the defendants could satisfy their burden of proof on the causation
question by proving that they could not have produced the DES to which the
plaintiff was exposed.' 86
 Each defendant manufacturer that failed to meet this
burden of proof, however, would become liable for that portion of the
plaintiff's judgment corresponding to its share of the market.'" The market
share theory thus substituted liability based upon market share in place of the
joint and several liability imposed by Summers. 188
'" Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
"8 Id. at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
' 79 Id.
ta° Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr, at 146.
181 See text at note 175 supra.
"' See text at note 176 supra.
1 " Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607-10, 607 P.2d 924, 933-35, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 141-43, art denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980). The theory of industry-wide liability
was expounded in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Hall theory is outlined and distinguished from the theory of concerted action at note 97,
supra.
184
 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980). The Sindell court, apparently to afford trial
courts a measure of discretion when judging the adequacy of the plaintiff's joinder of defendant
manufacturers, refused to define what it considered to be substantial. Id.
187 Id.
189
187
in Sec Sindell, Plaintiff s United States Supreme Court Brief, supra note 18, at 14-16 (ex-
planation of the difference between the Sindell, market share approach to liability allocation, and
the Summers, joint and several approach to liability allocation).
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In fashioning what it termed a "modification" of the Summers alternative
liability theory, 1 B 9 the Sindell court referred to section 433B of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which recognizes that situations may arise in which it would
be unfair to require joinder of all possibly responsible parties as a prerequisite
to shifting the burden of proof on the causation issue: 9° In a sense, therefore,
the market share theory can be viewed as simply the alternative liability theory
shorn of its requirement that all possible sources of the DES complained of be
joined as defendants:" Such analysis, however, would fail to recognize
another significant difference between the market share and alternative liability
theories. This second difference involves the manner in which each theory ap-
portions liability.
The Sindell court explicitly viewed the likelihood that any given DES
manufacturer produced the dosage that harmed the plaintiff as a function of
that firm's share of the relevant DES market:" Thus, if the plaintiff were to
join as defendants two manufacturers that together produced seventy-five per-
cent of the DES that the plaintiffs mother might have taken, the Sindell court
would take the view that there is a seventy-five percent chance that one of the
two defendants is responsible for the plaintiff's injury and only a twenty-five
percent chance that some other manufacturer is culpable. Since the only
evidence bearing on the likelihood that any given firm produced the relevant
DES typically is going to be that firm's share of the market, the court in Sindell
concluded that market share data present a ready and fair way of apportioning
liability. 193 In reaching this conclusion, the Sindell court decided that while a
firm's share of liability in practice may not correlate perfectly with its market
share, this disparity is not sufficient to deny plaintiffs recovery: 94
The court in Sindell was narrowly divided, with three of the court's seven
Justices dissenting: 95 The dissent vigorously protested what it viewed as the
majority's effective elimination of the element of factual causation from a DES
cause of action: 96 Arguing that the defendant manufacturers "are no more
capable of disproving factual causation than plaintiffs are of proving it," 1 " the
dissent maintained that under the market share theory, the plaintiffs will in
every case prevail on the causation issue. 198
The dissent also decried the fact that under the market share theory an in-
dividual manufacturer that enjoyed only a small share of the relevant market
and that therefore most likely did not supply the DES complained of, may
1 " Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144, eat denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
190
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 4338, Comment h (1965).
"I See text and notes at notes 165.66 supra.
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611-12, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
141 Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
194 Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
' 95 Id. at 614-22, 607 P.2d at 938-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51.
' 96 Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
19.1 Id.
1 " It
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nevertheless be held proportionately liable if its market share — when added to
the shares of its co-defendants — becomes substantial in the aggregate. 139 The
dissent believed that the plaintiffs should bear the burden of proving causation
in DES cases, 2" and, apparently, that they should be held to have satisfied that
burden only when they can, at a minimum, show that a single defendant
manufacturer probably supplied the DES at issue because it was alone respon-
sible for a majority of the DES that the plaintiff's mother might have taken."'
The dissent further objected to the market share theory because, unless it
is adopted generally throughout the nation, it will result in disproportionate ag-
gregate liability for those firms subject to suit in California. 202
 In other words,
if only a few other states adopt the market share theory or otherwise relieve
DES plaintiffs of the identification requirement, the dissent feared that DES
makers solvent and amenable to suit in California would bear more than their
rightful share of nationwide liability.
Considering the dissent's last point first, the dissent was clearly correct in
maintaining that the market share theory may cause DES makers within the
jurisdiction of the courts of California to bear more than their fair share of na-
tionwide liability. The failure of other states to follow the lead of California in
adopting the market share approach effectively will shield from liability those
DES makers not amenable to suit in California or in states that otherwise
dispense with the need for plaintiffs to pinpoint the source of the DES that
harmed them. Yet, if the market share theory is desirable in all other respects,
the refusal of other states to embrace it hardly seems to be a legitimate reason
for California to reject it as well.
The Sindell dissent indulged in overstatement in claiming that the market
share theory will allow the plaintiffs to prevail on the issue of causation in every
case. 203 In Sindell itself, one defendant manufacturer was dismissed from the
suit after establishing that it did not produce DES until after the plaintiff was
born and that it therefore could not be the source of the DES to which she had
been exposed. 204
 The dissenters were, nevertheless, essentially correct in their
contention that the market share theory effectively dispenses with the element
of factual causation in DES suits. In most cases the defendants will indeed be as
ignorant as the plaintiff as to the source of the DES at issue. Consequently, in-
dividual DES makers seldom will be able to disprove their responsibility for the
DES to which a given plaintiff was exposed. The dissent did not, however, ex-
plain why in situations where neither the plaintiff nor the defendants have
199 Id. at 615-16, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 614-17, 607 P.2d at 938-40, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-48 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing).
20 ' Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
2 °2 Id. at 617-18, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
203 See text at notes 196-98 supra.
204
 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
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reason to know whether any given defendant has actually caused the plaintiffs
injury, the burden of proving causation always should be upon the plaintiff. In-
deed, Summers stands as established California precedent that in certain situa-
tions the burden of proof on the question of factual causation should be placed
on the defendants, even though they have no realistic ability to meet that
burden . 2° 5
The dissent also was correct in asserting that, under the market share
theory, it will often be true in particular cases that not all and possibly even
none of the defendants held liable actually produced the DES to which the par-
ticular plaintiff was exposed. The dissent, however, accorded inadequate
recognition to the ability of the market share theory, if applied to all or most
DES cases, to roughly equate each manufacturer's aggregate liability with its
actual responsibility for all of the injuries caused by its DES. This matching of
aggregate liability and actual responsibility for all DES-related injuries is illus-
trated by the following example. If firm X sold twenty percent of all the DES
prescribed for use by pregnant women, and if identification could be made in
all cases, X would be liable for all of the damages recovered in about twenty
percent of the cases. Of course, the identification requirement cannot be
satisfied in most cases. 206 The market share theory, however, provides an alter-
native method of liability allocation under which, using the preceding example,
firm X would be joined in most of the DES cases and, where found liable,
would pay approximately twenty percent of the damages recovered in each
case. Firm X, consequently, would pay about the same total amount of
damages whether or not identification could be made. 207 In practice the cor-
relation between any firm's total responsibility and its aggregate liability will
not be perfect, 2 ° 8 but the market share theory has the potential — if widely
adopted by the states — to achieve a reasonably accurate matching of each
firm's actual responsibility for DES-related injuries with its total liability.
The market share theory, while achieving a more or less precise matching
of each manufacturer's liability and actual responsibility in the aggregate of
DES cases, cannot begin to achieve such precision in each individual case. To
equate precisely tort responsibility and liability in individual cases, the iden-
tification requirement must be satisfied, and that, unfortunately, is simply not
possible in most DES cases. 208 The majority and the dissent in Sindell differed
on the question whether the market share theory's failure to equate accurately
liability and responsibility in each individual DES case was a fatal flaw. The
dissent thought it was such a flaw,'" but in rejecting the market share ap-
20 ' See text at notes 108-13 supra.
205 See text and notes at notes 8.14 supra.
"7 FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 994 (presenting this hypothetical example in
the course of explaining and advocating its proposed theory of liability).
208 See Section IV. A. infra.
2" See text and notes at notes 8-14 supra.
21° Sindell v. Abbott Labs„ 26 Cal. 3d 588, 614-17, 607 P.2d 924, 938-40, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 146-48, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
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proach failed to explain how placing the rigors of the identification requirement
on DES plaintiffs would do anything but allow culpable producers to escape
liability altogether.
While the market share theory's rejection of joint and several liabilit y211
and its effective elimination of the element of factual causation 212 in an entire
class of tort cases represents a significant departure from existing law, it is a
departure approved by the California Supreme Court only after a careful con-
sideration of the interests involved in DES litigation. The theory rests upon
several specific and explicit policy judgments. For example, the market share
theory, described by the Sindell court as a modification of the Summers alter-
native liability theory, 213 rests upon a policy judgment that is substantially the
same as that underlying Summers. As between an innocent plaintiff, unable to
identify the specific tortfeasor that harmed him, and a group of tortfeasors, one
or more members of which most likely caused that harm, any injustice
associated with the determination or apportionment of liability should fall upon
the tortfeasors. 214
In justifying its decision to depart from existing law, the court in Sindell
noted that advances in science and technology often result in the creation of
potentially dangerous fungible goods that, for one reason or another, cannot be
traced back through the chain of distribution to the manufacturer. 215
 Faced
with this fact of modern industrial life, courts can elect either to cling
dogmatically to established legal doctrines that will — in these new industrial
contexts — work inequitable results, or, instead, they may creatively fashion
new remedies better suited to changed times and circurnstances. 216 Concerning
the need for occasional judicial innovation, the Sindell court referred to Justice
Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company."' In
Escola, Justice Traynor expressed the view that a law of products liability
grounded solely upon concepts of manufacturer negligence or privity between
the seller and the injured party, provided inadequate protection to consumers
in an era of complex mass marketing. 2 " The Sindell court expressed a similar
belief in the occasional need to alter tort law, in this case the rules of causation
and liability, in order to do justice in a particular case or class of cases. 219 Con-
sequently, a second policy underlying the Sindell decision is a belief in the occa-
sional desirability and necessity of judicial innovation.
2" See text and note at note 188 supra.
2" See text at notes 196-98 and 203-05 supra.
2 " See text at notes 189-91 supra.
2" Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-11, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144, cm. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
213 Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
216
217 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
216 Id. at 461-68, 150 P.2d at 440-44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936; 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
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A further policy explaining the market share theory is that of allocating the
cost of an injury to the party that is better able to bear it. The court in Sindell
was of the opinion that DES manufacturers are better able to absorb the costs
associated with DES-related injuries than are DES plaintiffs."° The market
share theory, therefore, represents a rather careful balancing of many of the
competing interests and equities present in the DES cases. 22 ' For instance, the
Sin&11 court considered the ability of the plaintiff to identify the source of the
specific DES to which she was exposed before birth, and the degree to which
she could be considered at fault in not being able to make such an identifica-
tion. 222 The court also weighed the relative ability of the parties to bear the
costs allegedly associated with DES use. 223 Finally, the court attempted to con-
struct a theory that would protect the legitimate desire of each DES maker to
not have to pay for harm caused by another firm's DES. 224
22 ' Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144, In another of its criticisms of the
market share theory, however, the dissent pointed out that the theory may — insofar as it leads to
the imposition of substantial additional liability upon the pharmaceutical industry — discourage
the development of new and useful drugs. Id. at 619-21, 607 P.2d at 941-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
149-51 (Richardson, J. dissenting). While the dissent's concern with encouraging the develop-
ment and dissemination of new and needed drugs is quite valid from the point of view of public
policy, that public policy should not be indirectly effectuated by placing upon DES plaintiffs the
identification requirement. Rather, if the public policy of fostering drug development and
distribution is sufficiently compelling, courts forthrightly should deny DES plaintiffs recovery on
the grounds of that policy, and should not rely on the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the identification
requirement.
721 Sec Sindell, Plaintiff's United States Supreme Court Brief, supra note 18, at 13 n.19,
where Sindcll's counsel listed the interests, factors, and equities explicitly considered by the
Sindell court as:
(1) The difficult problems created by a complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology which produce fungible goods which may harm inno-
cent consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
(2) The inability of the consumer "to protect himself from serious, sometimes per-
manent, sometimes fatal injuries caused by deleterious drugs."
(3) The availability of evidence of causation.
(4) The ability of the parties to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufac-
ture of a defective product.
(5) The ability of the parties to discover, warn, guard against, and insure for risk
of such injuries.
(6) The need to distribute the costs of such injuries to the manufacturer of the pro-
duct and among the public as a cost of doing business.
(7) The possibility of holding a group of defendants liable for the injury, none of
which was the actual manufacturer of the DES that the plaintiff's mother in-
gested.
(8) The possibility that each manufacturer's liability may not precisely conform to
the injuries caused by its own products.
(9) The problems of determining market share with mathematical exactitude.
(10) The propriety of using market share as opposed to joint and several liability as
a method of cost-spreading. [Citations omitted.[
Id.
222 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr, at 145-46.
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In addition to representing a careful balancing and reconciliation of con-
flicting interests, the market share theory also signifies a recognition that the
factual circumstances of the typical DES case present new problems that tradi-
tional tort theories and principles cannot equitably address. To deny relief
because of the plaintiff's inability to identify the source of the DES that harmed
her seems unacceptably harsh. Yet, traditional tort theories and principles
would, if strictly applied, in most cases do precisely that. Courts determined to
relieve DES plaintiffs of their identification burden face a choice. Those courts
can either stretch existing theories beyond their established and seemingly
proper bounds, or they can honestly admit the "gap in tort law" 225 that the
DES cases present and creatively and forthrightly formulate a new rule of law
tailored to do justice in those cases. The Sindell court chose the latter route.
While the market share theory therefore stands as the best approach to the
DES identification problem yet devised by the courts, it has yet to be fully
developed. Some of the questions concerning the theory that were not explicitly
answered by the Sindell court are considered in the following section.
IV. QUESTIONS AND PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE MARKET SHARE THEORY
The market share theory is the best approach to the DES identification
problem yet devised. It relieves DES plaintiffs of the need to satisfy the iden-
tification requirement in those cases where it appears that there is a substantial
likelihood that one of the joined defendants did in fact manufacture the DES
that harmed the plaintiff. The theory, however, does not require the plaintiff to
prove that the manufacturers actively cooperated in producing and marketing
DES. Nor does the market share theory demand that the plaintiff join every
possible supplier of the DES to which she was exposed in order to benefit from
a shift in the burden of proof on the causation question. Finally, the theory
allocates liability among defendant manufacturers more precisely and
equitably than do contribution rules that divide liability equally among defend-
ants held jointly and severally liable. Despite the many enumerated strengths
of the market share theory, however, ambiguities and questions remain about
some aspects of the theory. It will be, therefore, the aim of this section to ex-
plore some of these questions and ambiguities and to make proposals concern-
ing the practical operation of the theory.
A. Should the Plaintiff be Entitled to Recover only that Percentage of her Damages that
Corresponds to the Percentage of the Relevant Market Joined in her Suit?
In outlining the contours of the market share theory, the Sindell court did
not express an intention to limit a plaintiff to recovery of the percentage of her
damages that corresponds to the percentage of the market accounted for by the
defendants joined to her lawsuit. It appears, therefore, that a plaintiff who is
226
 FORDHAM COMMENT, supra note 3, at 1007.
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successful under the market share theory can recover one hundred percent of
her damages from defendants that together account for less than one hundred
percent of the DES that her mother might have taken.
Allowing the plaintiff to recover in full, however, may not be the most
prudent approach. Such a rule may cause a very few DES manufacturers to
bear all of the damages awarded in DES suits. For example, assume that a
plaintiff, unable to satisfy the identification requirement, sues two DES makers
whose respective shares of the relevant DES market were fifty percent (firm A)
and twenty-five percent (firm B). If the court deemed seventy-five percent of
the market sufficiently substantial to shift the burden of proof on the issue of
causation to the defendants, and if neither defendant could sustain that
burden, the plaintiff apparently would be able to recover one hundred percent
of her damages from defendants that together were responsible for only
seventy-five percent of the DES that might have done the damage. Two con-
clusions follow from this example. First, each defendant bears a portion of the
plaintiff's damage award that substantially exceeds its market share. Firm A,
with a market share that is twice that of firm B, presumably bears twice as
much of the plaintiff's damages as does firm B. Thus, firm A, while responsible
for only fifty percent of the DES that might have reached and harmed the
plaintiff, is liable for about sixty-seven percent of her damages, while firm B,
with a market share of twenty-five percent, must shoulder roughly thirty-three
percent of those damages. Second, if the facts of the hypothetical case were
replicated in three other lawsuits, it would be statistically likely that in one of
the four cases neither of the defendants would have produced the DES that
caused the injury for which they were being held liable. These two conclusions
raise serious doubts about the wisdom and fairness of allowing a full recovery
in those cases in which less than the entire market has been joined to the suit.
Three arguments support the proposition that DES plaintiffs should in
every case recover one hundred percent of their damages, regardless of the
percentage of the market joined. First, an underlying premise of the market
share theory is that between an innocent plaintiff and a group of tortfeasors,
one or more members of which have most likely caused the plaintiff harm,
hardship associated with the determination and division of liability should fall
upon the defendants. 22G Second, in practice, a high percentage of the relevant
market will be accounted for by the joined defendants, minimizing the dispari-
ty between market shares and damage shares. 227 Third, defendants can always
226 See text at notes 213-14 supra.
2" For example, the plaintiff in Sinai claimed that it had been estimated that six or
seven DES makers together accounted for ninety percent "of the market for this drug." Sindell,
Plaintiff's California Supreme Court Brief, supra note 4, at 5. Dr. Don Fraser, Director of New
England Drug Information Consultation Services, however, doubts that such a small number of
manufacturers accounted for so large a proportion of pregnancy-related DES sales throughout
the nation. Interview at the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Allied Health Sciences,
Boston (January 5, 1981).
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implead other manufacturers that supplied DES to the relevant market, thus
reducing each defendant's proportionate share of any damages recovered by
the plaintiff. 228 The arguments that favor allowing DES plaintiffs to recover
one hundred percent of their damages in every case have some merit. On
balance, however, it is preferable to restrict a successful DES plaintiff to
recovery of only that percentage of her damages that corresponds to the
percentage of the relevant DES market accounted for by those manufacturers
joined as defendants. Such an approach recommends itself for two reasons.
First, such a limit on plaintiffs' recoveries would encourage DES plaintiffs
to select a forum in which they could join as many possible sources of the drug
as practicable, so as to recover the maximum possible percentage of their
damages. Second, and more importantly, by limiting a plaintiff's damages to
the portion of the relevant market joined, maximum precision in correlating
the defendants' aggregate liability with their actual responsibility for harm
caused by their DES would be achieved. 229 This can be demonstrated by refer-
ring to a previous hypothetical example. 23 ° If firms A and B together produced
seventy-five percent of the DES used in pregnancy, they presumably are
responsible for approximately seventy-five percent of the DES-related injuries
suffered by those plaintiffs who were exposed to the drug while in utero. Firms
A and B should pay, therefore, seventy-five percent of the damages recovered
in those cases in which the source of the DES is unknown. Requiring instead
that firms A and B pay one hundred percent of the plaintiffs' damages would
mean that in roughly one of every four cases A and B would be paying for in-
juries that neither of them actually caused. Such a result would seem to be at
odds with the Sindell court's assurance that under the market share theory,
"each manufacturer's liability ... would approximate its responsibility for the
injuries caused by its own products. "23'
Consequently, while the Sindell market share theory appears to allow a
successful plaintiff to recover all of her damages from defendants that together
account for less than all of the DES that might have done the damage, the bet-
ter rule is to limit the plaintiff to recovery of the percentage of her damages that
corresponds to the percentage of the relevant market joined in her suit.
B. Questions and Proposals Concerning Market Share Data
The Sindell court left for future consideration any problems of proof
associated with the determination of market shares. 232 Indeed, the question of
229 See text at note 185 supra.
229 See text at notes 206.08 supra, for an example of how the market share theory, ideal-
ly, can equate each manufacturer's aggregate liability with its actual responsibility for all of the
injuries caused by its DES.
23° See the hypothetical example involving firms A and B contained in text between
notes 225 and 226 supra.
231 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
232 Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
May 1981]	 DES	 779
precisely what market share a given firm enjoyed at a particular time will often
be a matter of dispute at trial, as it will determine the extent of each
defendant's liability to the plaintiff."' Determination of market shares will be
difficult for various reasons. First, not all of the DES made during the past
three decades was produced and marketed as a treatment to prevent miscar-
riage. Among other things, DES also was used as a treatment for menopausal
problems, a lactation suppressant during the post-partum period, and as a
treatment for prostate cancer. 234 Thus, while a particular firm may have pro-
duced and sold a great deal of DES, it may be quite difficult to ascertain what
portion of its total DES output was sold for use by pregnant women. Second,
before market shares may be ascertained, the scope of the relevant market must
be defined, and as to this problem, the Sindell opinion offered little guidance.
The Sindell court only obliquely stated what it considered to be the scope of
the relevant market: that DES which a plaintiff's mother "might have
taken."'" The court recognized that definition of the appropriate market
would present practical problems. 236 Adopting Sindell's definition, the relevant
market might be a single pharmacy, a group of pharmacies, and so on, depend-
ing upon where the plaintiff's mother purchased her DES. The problems of
proof in establishing the relevant market, under Sindell's rather cryptic
guidelines, seem enormous. First, Sindell gave no indication whether plaintiffs
or defendants bear the burden of proof on the issue of the appropriate scope of
the market. Second, the opinion does not suggest what the consequences are of
a party's failure to meet this burden. Third, the case does not disclose how, in
an attempt to define the relevant market, either party might prove that the
plaintiff's mother bought DES from a particular pharmacy when, as will often
be the case, the purchases occurred twenty-five or thirty years ago and perti-
nent records and witnesses have long since disappeared. 237 It appears,
therefore, that trial courts may be forced to devote an inordinate amount of time
merely to the determination of the scope of the relevant DES market.
Rather than engage a court in laborious, time-consuming, and confusing
factfinding on the issue of what the appropriate market should be in any given
case, it seems preferable to presume in every case that the appropriate market
is the United States as a whole. Such a rule will strike a compromise between
precision and practicality. On the one hand, such a presumption will allow for
apportionment of liability according to the manufacturers' nationwide market
2" Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
234 Physician's Desk Reference 951 (31st ed. 1977).
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 145, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980),
236 Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
237 For example, Judith Sindell's mother ingested the DES to which Judith was exposed
in 1950, Sindell, Plaintiff's California Supreme Court Brief, supra note 4, at 26. In Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978), records and testimony (recollections) needed to
enable the plaintiff to satisfy the identification requirement were destroyed or otherwise lost
because of the passage of time. Id. at 338.
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shares rather than on an equal basis, and thus will be a step toward greater
precision and fairness in the allocation of liability for DES-related injuries. On
the other hand, while further narrowing the scope of the market to a few phar-
macies would yield even greater precision in liability allocation, it surely would
also magnify the problems of proof faced by the trial court. Therefore, by
presumptively fixing the United States as a whole as the relevant market, a
reasonable compromise between precision in liability allocation and judicial ef-
ficiency will be reached. Since the nation as a whole should be presumed to be
the relevant market, nationwide market share data should be presumed as
well. If such data does not now exist, 238 some agency of the federal government
should begin the process of constructing such data.
In any case in which the market share theory is utilized, the court should
therefore adopt as a rebuttable presumption nationwide market share data. If
either the plaintiff or the defendants object to this presumption, it should be up
to the objecting party to demonstrate why another market unit or other market
share data should be relied upon by the court in judging the adequacy of the
plaintiffs joinder or in determining the liability of each of the defendants. For
example, if a DES firm with a nationwide market share of eight percent can
establish that it sold no DES during the relevant time period in the state where
the plaintiff's mother purchased her DES, that firm will have met its burden of
demonstrating the inapplicability of nationwide market share data to it and will
be dismissed from the suit. Likewise, if the plaintiff can show that firm A, while
enjoying only a two percent share of nationwide DES sales, in fact supplied one
half of the pregnancy-related DES sold by the pharmacy from which the plain-
tiff's mother obtained her DES, the plaintiff will have rebutted the pre-
sumption of firm A's two percent market share. In any case, while apportion-
ing liability among DES producers according to their respective market shares
is a sound idea insofar as it promises a more equitable division of liability than
do contribution rules that divide liability equally, the need to conserve the
courts' time argues in favor of adopting as presumptions what are admittedly
only rough approximations of actual market shares in any given case, leaving it
to dissatisfied litigants to show that justice in.a particular case requires adop-
tion of different data than those presumed.
If reliable market share data relating to individual states are now
available, or become available, those data, rather than national market share
statistics, should be adopted by the courts in the interest of achieving greater
precision in equating each manufacturer's total liability with its actual respon-
sibility for the harm caused by its DES.
It is submitted, therefore, that while the Sindell market share theory is the
best approach to the DES identification problem yet sanctioned by the courts,
238 Defendants in Slade!, claimed that no such data were available. Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613 n.29, 607 P.2d 924, 937 n.29, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 n.29, cert.
denied, 49 'U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980). Dr. Don Fraser, Director of New England Drug Information
Consultation Services., also doubts that any reliable DES market share data are available for most
pharmaceutical companies. Interview at the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy and Allied
Health Sciences, Boston (January 5, 1981).
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certain modifications can make it even better. First, a successful plaintiff
should recover only that percentage of her damages corresponding to the por-
tion of the relevant DES market represented by the producers joined to her
suit. Such a rule will insure that the market share theory achieves the most ac-
curate matching of each manufacturer's total liability and actual tort respon-
sibility that is possible in the absence of the ability of the plaintiffs to satisfy the
identification requirement. Second, as a compromise between the precision of
allocating liability on the basis of market shares and the need to conserve the
courts' time, national or, preferably, state market share data should be
presumed in every case. Those parties that object to the use of such presumed
data should bear the burden of demonstrating that other data should be used in
their particular case.
CONCLUSION
The DES cases present the courts with a choice as to how the law shall re-
spond to a novel situation."' This note has surveyed and scrutinized the range
of current judicial responses to this choice. It has been seen that there is
authority to the effect that if a plaintiff cannot identify the source of the DES to
which she was exposed before birth, she cannot recover for her harm. 24° It has
also been held that a plaintiff may circumvent the identification requirement by
employing theories developed in other contexts, such as the alternative liability
theory, 241 some for entirely different purposes, such as the concerted action
theory. 242 Yet another court has ruled that the DES cases' new and fundamen-
tally different fact pattern justifies the formulation of an entirely new theory,
the market share theory, 243 to do justice in those cases.
It is submitted that of the three approaches outlined above and surveyed
in this note, the market share theory of California, while it has yet to be fully
developed and would benefit from certain alterations, combines the merits of
achieving a just and carefully considered result with a refusal to do violence to
existing legal theories by stretching them to govern extraordinary new fact pat-
terns. The market share theory, therefore, stands as the best response to the
DES identification problem yet devised. It must be recognized that carefully
considered and crafted forthright judicial innovation is at times preferable to no
innovation, or to innovation concealed in the garb of traditional legal theories.
STEVEN D. EIMERT
239 See text and notes at notes 8-14 supra.
24° Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See text at notes
24-41 supra.
24 ' Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73-77, 289 N.W.2d 20, 25-27 (1979);
Accord, Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305, 1312-16 (1980).
See text at notes 129-59 supra.
242 Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 72-73, 289 N.W.2d 20, 24-25 (1979).
See text at notes 78-92 supra.
243 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 144-46, cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3270 (1980).
